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I. INTRODUCTION 
For at least a hundred years, legal scholars have sought a “theory of 
the firm,” some sort of theoretical account of the corporation.1 Scholars 
continue to write about the nature of the business corporation, and con-
ferences such as this one continue to be held, so perhaps an adequate 
theory has proven elusive. Or perhaps professors produce texts because 
that is what professors do. And maybe periodic reconsideration of core 
questions is the way an academic discipline renews itself, i.e., legitimates 
the next generation, without redefining itself altogether. But rather than 
understand this perennial need for a theory of the firm as intellectual 
work that needs to be done (because our forebears did not solve the prob-
lem), or in terms of the sociology of the profession, I want to explore a 
dominant account of the firm as a symptom of political anxiety. 
Modern agency law—the consensual agreement of one person to 
work for and under the control of another—has been widely used to pro-
vide a general framework for understanding a great deal of business law.2 
Agency law concepts can be used to frame pedagogical, scholarly, insti-
tutional, and even political discourses. In so doing, modern agency law 
addresses concerns about the institution of the corporation, generally by 
reference to contract: institutions are created out of essentially consensu-
al, and hence justifiable, relationships among autonomous individuals. 
                                                        
∗ Floyd H. & Hilda L. Hurst Faculty Scholar and Professor of Law, SUNY Buffalo Law School. 
Once again, I owe Jack Schlegel thanks for a careful reading and sound suggestions. The mistakes 
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 1. John Dewey, The Historic Background of Corporate Legal Personality, 35 YALE L.J. 655, 
655–73 (1926). 
 2. See, e.g., DAVID G. EPSTEIN ET AL., BUSINESS STRUCTURES (3rd ed. 2010); WILLIAM A. 
KLEIN ET AL., BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS, CASES AND MATERIALS ON AGENCY, PARTNERSHIPS, AND 
CORPORATIONS (7th ed. 2010); ALAN PALMITER & FRANK PARTNOY, CORPORATIONS: A 
CONTEMPORARY APPROACH (2009). 
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So modern agency law is more than a “theory” of the firm in the narrow 
sense of theory; modern agency law provides a liberal myth or ideology 
for business associations. 
As discussed below, the effort to establish the firm on the bedrock 
of modern agency law is serviceable for many social purposes, notably 
classroom teaching, but falls short in at least two ways. First, key corpo-
rate relations can be translated into agency law only by squinting in dim 
light. Second, agency law cannot really be understood solely in terms of 
consent. The problems with status and hierarchy found in the corporation 
are replicated in agency law, which used to be discussed more candidly 
in terms of master and servant. So while modern agency law provides a 
handy language for articulating much of corporate life, it does not allay 
the anxieties with which we seek a theory of the firm. Our theory is shal-
low. 
A less than gentle reader might ask: But so what? Why should 
modern agency law, of all things, be taken so seriously? Much of what 
follows in the remainder of this Essay is familiar, at least to law profes-
sors. Doctrinal structures are subjected to logical pressure that they can-
not bear; contradictions emerge, and the author declares victory. But this 
is only a “victory” for thought under the strange assumption that agency 
law—or corporation law—is or should be highly intellectually con-
sistent. While perhaps convenient for job talks, the idea that law is con-
sistent has not been serious since Aeschylus.3 The structure of law is 
tragic; the law’s commitments are conflicted. Why, then, dwell on these 
relatively trivial difficulties with modern agency law’s apology for the 
firm? Why engage in extenuated doctrinal logic and close reading of old 
cases to debunk modern agency law? The vocabulary and grammar of 
agency law works well enough for teaching, policy discourse, and a 
rough and ready understanding of corporate law. Why be impolite? 
If this less than gentle reader were in a mood not just to attack the 
text but also to take its author to the mat, it might be said that while the 
present Essay argues that anxiety is the mother of theory, surely anxiety 
has more than one child? Does not the sort of impolite critique undertak-
en here at least suggest the author’s anxiety, or anger, or hope for some-
thing else—some emotion aroused by the misuse of agency law doc-
trine?4 Otherwise, why does the author simply not accept the apology 
                                                        
 3. See AESCHYLUS, THE EUMENIDES (Hugh Lloyd-Jones trans., Prentice-Hall, Inc. 1970) (458 
B.C.E.). 
 4. A digression must be relegated to the notes. In the case of a job talk, or more generally the 
young and ambitious, one might think the turn to theory, or criticism of theory, was motivated by 
ambition rather than anxiety. But ambition is not necessarily free of anxiety, the fear of not making 
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made by agency law for the modern business corporation, inadequate as 
it is? Ad hominem, perhaps, but on the mark nonetheless. 
One might begin to respond to this attack by noting that under-
standing the corporation in the essentially contractual and therefore indi-
vidualistic terms of modern agency amounts to an intellectual avoidance 
of the social. Within the firm, modern agency law understands relations 
in terms of contract (Cardozo’s “morals of the marketplace”) rather than 
in terms of obligations imposed by society as an attribute of status, as a 
fiduciary or otherwise.5 In the world at large, modern agency law paints 
the firm as essentially private rather than public, as having more liberty 
interest than social purpose. Under such conceptual conditions, building 
a more sensible capitalism is hard to imagine. 
This Essay argues that a more candid understanding of agency, in 
which social role and even power are explicitly acknowledged, might 
enable us to think in more sophisticated terms about the nature of corpo-
rate life and what society may hope from corporations. Part II discusses 
the impulse to define the firm in order to address worries about corpora-
tions. Part III examines the centrality of modern agency law for contem-
porary corporate law discourse. Part IV asserts that modern agency law, 
based on and legitimated by consent, does a poor job of accounting for 
corporate, or even simple agency, relations. Agency law therefore cannot 
serve as the basis for a robust theory, that is, legitimation, of the firm. 
Finally, this Essay concludes by suggesting how a more candid under-
standing of agency might help us think about corporate life in terms of 
business purpose, which might provide purchase for efforts to think seri-
ously about markets, and perhaps even political economy. 
II. WHY DOES THE FIRM NEED A THEORY? 
It is not immediately obvious why a theory of the firm has been so 
long and so widely felt to be required. Indeed, it is not clear what sort of 
account could possibly satisfy the desire for a theory. Surely any imagi-
nable theory of the firm would be founded on similarly vague concepts 
like “transaction costs” or “capital structure” or even “agency.” The pa-
pers in this issue of the Seattle University Law Review were occasioned 
by a very good conference, Berle III. But for all its merit, Berle III did 
not deliver a theory of the firm that resolves the question and satisfies the 
                                                                                                                            
one’s mark, the need to overthrow the fathers (the anxiety of influence), and the like. Those things 
said, and despite what I have said in the text, I do not want to foreclose the possibility of thought 
distinct from fear. 
 5. See Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928). 
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desire. The question remains open, and future conferences on the matter 
will be held. 
But as William James pointed out in a somewhat different context, 
treating social phenomena as propositions and evaluating their validity 
(the tendency of a certain sort of philosopher) may not be wise.6 Some 
things merely are, and thus should be understood as opposed to con-
firmed or denied. James was talking about religious experience, and cor-
porate law scholarship (indeed law and society scholarship generally) 
could do worse than taking the sort of pragmatic turn that James coun-
seled for the philosophical consideration of religious experience. At the 
same time, it is interesting—and I think James would have found it inter-
esting—that some social phenomena seem to call for articulation in terms 
of social principles that are somehow felt to be fundamental. The “firm” 
is one such idea; “human dignity” is another.7 But the turn to ontology is 
hardly an everyday occurrence in American life, so what are we to make 
of the varieties of ontological desire, as it were? Why pursue theories of 
the firm? 
One might think that a theory of the firm would be helpful to stu-
dents who are trying to figure out what a corporation is. As discussed 
below, agency law is indeed useful for tying together much of the basic 
course on business associations. Yet, while theory has its uses in the 
classroom, our students come to the legal academy informally knowing 
what corporations are, for the simple reason that our students, too, live in 
a commercial society. And students do not graduate (nor should they 
graduate) thinking they “know” what the corporation is in any fundamen-
tally different way. The legal academy has few if any new answers. It is 
true that the professoriate has numerous ways to characterize the corpo-
ration, and the professoriate continues to hold conferences where, with 
luck, new and clever things will be said. But the legal academy’s theori-
zations of the firm are essentially incomplete, multivalent, overlapping 
articulations of existing social commitments—and that is the point: to 
sophisticate what is thought about the firm. Doctrinal theorizations of the 
firm are (and ought to be) refinements of preexisting social understand-
ings. Legal theory articulates the social; it does not replace the social 
with something else. After all, in business associations and other classes, 
what we teach is the law of the society of which almost all of our stu-
dents are members. 
                                                        
 6. See generally WILLIAM JAMES, THE VARIETIES OF RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE (1902). 
 7. See Mary Ann Glendon, The Bearable Lightness of Dignity, FIRST THINGS, May 2011, at 41, 
available at http://www.firstthings.com/article/2011/04/the-bearable-lightness-of-dignity. 
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But if we understand legal doctrines to be formalized and often en-
forceable articulations of the social, and if we perceive that here and in a 
few other places, doctrine requires the turn to ontology, then maybe the 
very word “theory,” implying the detachment of the theorist, is mislead-
ing. This aspect of social life, the firm, is inadequately articulated, and 
therefore needs a theory; this requires some theoretical account and 
probably a justification. That is, the necessity felt for a theory of the firm, 
as well as the proliferation of unsatisfying theories, bespeaks a cultural 
anxiety.8 Bluntly, we need a theory of the firm because we are worried 
about the corporation. The not so gentle reader is correct. 
Worries about the role of corporations in the United States are cer-
tainly at a high-water mark. Specific contemporary examples include the 
furor over the Citizens United decision, Occupy Wall Street and kindred 
happenings, and the attack on Mitt Romney’s campaign for the Republi-
can nomination for U.S. President by other Republicans, generally a 
business-friendly lot. The worries underlying such recent issues, howev-
er, are neither new nor restricted to populist quarters. Venerable exam-
ples of concern about the corporation among leading theorists are not 
hard to find. For example, in 1937, at the height of Stalin’s power, 
Ronald Coase wrote: 
Those who object to economic planning on the grounds that the 
problem is solved by price movements can be answered by pointing 
out that there is planning within our economic system which is quite 
different from the individual planning mentioned above and which 
is akin to what is normally called economic planning.9 
If markets really worked, why were corporations necessary? And if cor-
porations were necessary, was it so obvious that the Soviets were wrong? 
In a different but related vein, John Dewey subordinated the endless 
wrangling over the nature of the firm to the mostly regulatory ends of the 
theorist: “For the purposes of law the conception of ‘person’ is a legal 
conception; put roughly, ‘person’ signifies what law makes it signify.”10 
I may multiply examples, but to generalize: the need for a theory of the 
firm bespeaks not the detachment, but the concerned engagement of the 
                                                        
 8. See S. Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 222 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting). While Holmes 
could be quite acidic about mystical approaches to law (“brooding omnipresence”), he was sensitive 
to the fact that law’s claims to rationality are limited. 
 9. R. H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386, 387–88 (1937). 
 10. Dewey, supra note 1, at 655. 
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scholar. True philosophy may begin in wonder,11 but social criticism—of 
which legal theory is a branch—begins in worry. 
The response to a worry, including that of theorizing, is by nature 
somewhat defensive. One need look no further than Berle and Means, 
who begin their magnum opus by talking at great length about the con-
centration of power in contemporary society: 
In its new aspect the corporation is a means whereby the wealth of 
innumerable individuals has been concentrated into huge aggregates 
and whereby control over this wealth has been surrendered to a uni-
fied direction. The power attendant upon such concentration has 
brought forth princes of industry, whose position in the community 
is yet to be defined.12 
And lest their concern be missed: “As between a political organization of 
society and an economic organization of society which will be the domi-
nant form?”13 
Coase is also worried about the power created by the structure of 
firms, which for him institutionalize coercion (colloquially known as 
“being the boss”).14 For Coase, theorizing about firms begins with the 
observation that in markets, where autonomous actors contract to set 
price, much business is done by firms, which operate through commands 
rather than prices. Employment contracts, evidently, are special kinds of 
contracts: 
The contract is one whereby the factor [the employee, a “factor” of 
production], for a certain remuneration (which may be fixed or fluc-
tuating), agrees to obey the directions of an entrepreneur within cer-
tain limits. The essence of the contract is that it should only state the 
limits to the powers of the entrepreneur. Within these limits, he can 
therefore direct the other factors of production.15 
But what establishes limits, and why? Coase admits that the an-
swers are noneconomic: “It would be possible for no limits to the power 
of the entrepreneur to be fixed. This would be voluntary slavery. Accord-
ing to Professor Batt, The Law of Master and Servant, p. 18, such a con-
tract would be void and unenforceable.”16 Thus, for Coase, the logic of 
                                                        
 11. PLATO, THEAETETUS 210 (Benjamin Jowett trans., Oxford Univ. 1892) (360 B.C.E.); 
ARISTOTLE, METAPHYSICS (W. D. Ross trans., Oxford Univ. 1924). 
 12. ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE 
PROPERTY 2, 18–46 (Macmillan 1933) (1932). 
 13. Id. at viii. 
 14. Coase, supra note 9. 
 15. Id.  
 16. Id. at 391 n.2. 
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the firm entails the possibility of slavery, but agency law sets boundaries 
to the firm’s tendency to dominate. 
Agency law is a thin reed and, as discussed below, should not allay 
the anxieties about corporate power expressed by Berle and Means, or by 
Coase. At this juncture, it is important to note, however, that while legal 
theory may not answer, it does a fine job of diagnosing: social anxieties 
may be traced through the theories we use to articulate, and perhaps jus-
tify, reform or otherwise assert control over such institutions. Thus, un-
derstanding the move to theory in general terms, theorizing about firms 
may help people think through the roles corporations ought to play in 
social life.17 If the corporation is “this,” then people should feel about it 
“thus”—and law should reflect those beliefs. So to take the infamous 
recent example of Citizens United v. FEC, if the corporation is at the bot-
tom an association of individuals, then perhaps the corporation should 
enjoy the political speech rights held by such individuals.18 Or perhaps 
not.19 
Whatever the relationship between the modern business corporation 
and political speech, the point here is that theories of the firm are efforts 
to name a social phenomenon that is threatening, so the theorist (and by 
extension, the society that the theorist teaches) can assert a stance toward 
the firm. As poets, legislators, law professors, and other shamans know, 
naming matters for worship, for the exercise of power, for teaching, for 
many things. But can naming the corporation as an expression of agency 
law—and asserting that people, agents, are free—really constrain corpo-
rate power and guarantee republican politics (Berle and Means) or the 
liberty of individuals (Coase)? Unfortunately, no. 
III. AGENCY LAW IN CORPORATE DISCOURSE 
Modern agency law concepts run throughout contemporary dis-
course on the corporation, but they are nowhere more visible than in the 
basic course on business associations. As already noted, textbooks writ-
ten for use in business associations tend to start with and go on at great 
lengths describing agency.20 Agency concepts may even structure the 
basic course.21 Moreover, state bar examiners test agency law doctrines. 
                                                        
 17. For an extended discussion of the corporation in terms of role, see DAVID A. WESTBROOK, 
BETWEEN CITIZEN AND STATE: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE CORPORATION (2008). 
 18. See Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010). 
 19. See David A. Westbrook, If Not a Commercial Republic? Political Economy in the United 
States After Citizens United, 50 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 35 (2011). 
 20. See EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 2. 
 21. See, e.g., id. 
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As discussed further below, judges, regulators, and scholars routinely 
discuss corporate behavior and regulation in terms of agency. In short, 
much corporate discourse is played in the key of modern agency. 
A. The Importance of the “Modern” in Contemporary Agency Law 
“Modern” here means a relation based on individual consent, as 
opposed to something else.22 Particularly in the legal context, this use of 
modern recalls Henry Sumner Maine’s famous statement, and a great 
deal of progressive ideology since, that “the movement of the progres-
sive societies has hitherto been a movement from Status to Contract.”23 
In this view, the essence of modernity is the contract freely entered into. 
Conversely, social relations based on something other than contract, such 
as birth, are archaic. 
As articulated most authoritatively by the American Law Institute’s 
Third Restatement of Agency, contemporary agency law is modern in 
precisely this sense, in insisting on consent as the foundation of relations. 
Consider the restatement’s definition of agency: 
Agency is the fiduciary relationship that arises when one person (a 
“principal”) manifests assent to another person (an “agent”) that the 
agent shall act on the principal’s behalf and subject to the princi-
pal’s control, and the agent manifests assent or otherwise consents 
so to act.24 
So agency is by definition a matter of consent, and thus presumably 
a notional equality, in much if not precisely the same way that both par-
ties are bound by contract.25 Modernizing agency law, to make it seem a 
matter between consenting adults, has required some creative redescrip-
tion of ancient relationships. Clever writing aside, agent and principal are 
not normally thought of in terms of equality. Nor are employer and em-
ployee presumed to be peers. And until very recently, agency law used 
“master” and “servant” as terms of art.26 So modern notions of agency 
law are contrasted with ancient or archaic notions around this question of 
                                                        
 22. “Liberal”—in the sense of Kant’s concern for individual autonomy—might be a better 
word. But as my immediate qualification of “liberal” suggests, the word is now used in so many 
ways as to be very confusing. 
 23. HENRY SUMNER MAINE, ANCIENT LAW 47–71 (E. P. Dutton & Co. 1917) (1861). In fair-
ness to Maine, he explicitly excludes from “status” those relations, such as employment relations or 
even marriage, that are the result of agreements. 
 24. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 (2006). 
 25. Note that the agency relationship, while consensual, does not require the existence of an 
enforceable contract, although such a contract, e.g., an employment contract, may be involved. 
 26. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 2 (1958). The Third Restatement of Agency 
eliminates the terms. 
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contract: the modern agency relation is understood to be essentially con-
tractual, based on autonomous choice if not always enforceable by a le-
gal document. The archaic relation is based on status.27 
B. The Successes of Modern Agency Law as an Approach to 
the Business Corporation 
There are at least four reasons for the success of modern agency 
law as an approach to the contemporary firm. First, teaching: agency law, 
in conjunction with finance, usefully ties together a number of issues in 
the basic business associations classroom. Second, scholarship: agency 
provides a fairly technical (and therefore reassuring) jargon with which a 
number of academic notions may be articulated. Third, institutional hy-
giene: as already suggested, agency law appears to allay liberal concerns 
about the relations of hierarchy and status that characterize corporate life, 
and thus our economy and much of our society. Fourth, political econo-
my: in the same vein as point three, agency law offers a rather comforta-
ble answer for the perennial and loaded question, “What is the corpora-
tion?” 
1. Teaching 
As a loose theory of the firm, modern agency law is at its best in the 
classroom and has worked well enough for at least a generation of text-
books. The students’ experience of employment—that one tries to “get a 
job” and an employer may or may not choose to hire—accords with the 
restatement’s emphasis on the voluntary nature of the transaction.28 Even 
more importantly for pedagogical purposes, agency provides a plausible 
narrative about the emergence of various forms of business associations 
and allows the teacher to tell a story that logically organizes such associ-
ations. A sole proprietorship can only be so big. In order for the business 
to grow, the owner must hire employees, thereby establishing agency 
relations. As the business grows, the firm tends to become larger and 
more structurally complex. Financing needs generate various new rela-
tionships, all of which may be described, at least in part, in terms of 
agency. Thus, agency is an integral part of the orthodox and effective 
narrative for teaching business associations, in which business opportuni-
                                                        
 27. See infra pp. 1393–96. (discussing Kidd v. Thomas A. Edison, Inc., 239 F. 405 (S.D.N.Y. 
1917)). 
 28. As I point out to my students, they already know most of the social relations articulated by 
agency law doctrines. The vast majority of law students have been employees, and they interact with 
employees in their retail dealings. From such experience, students come to class with a rough and 
ready understanding of who is responsible, and so, in the eyes of the law, liable. 
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ties require financing, and financing creates an organizational structure 
that is legally defined and enforced. Agency then is the principle of oper-
ational extension—delegation of legal authority combined with over-
sight—that allows us to think about very large businesses and very small 
businesses on much the same terms. But whether this principle is wise is 
another question. 
In recent years, business law professors have tried to make their 
classes more attuned to actual legal practice and, in particular, to transac-
tional work. Agency law is useful to this pedagogical effort, because 
agency articulates a set of problems that transactional lawyers regularly 
confront in practice: who is authorized to bind a firm, and what language 
counts as legally binding, thereby transferring risks? Insofar as law is the 
mysterious mediating link between mere words and social action, e.g., 
the transfer of title, the quality of the words spoken matter a great deal. 
So lawyers have to cope with the question of whether this person’s signa-
ture binds this rather diffuse institution, which we discuss in terms of 
authorization of the agent. 
2. Scholarship 
Agency is also appealing to legal scholars because it provides a 
language at once familiar and technical with which many aspects of cor-
porate life may be articulated. For example, the “separation of ownership 
and control” (shareholders own the company but do not run it), said by 
Berle and Means to characterize the modern business corporation, is now 
often rephrased as an agency problem: the principals (shareholders) are 
unable to monitor and control their agents (the management).29 In partic-
ular, the tendency of corporate executives to persuade boards of directors 
to award enormous “compensation” packages is an agency problem. 
Commonly proposed responses, such as “say on pay” or securities law 
disclosure of the details of executive compensation, may be understood 
as making it easier for principal-shareholders to know what “their” 
agent-executives are doing. 
Indeed, once one accepts the idea that managers are the agents of 
shareholders, most of the traditional concerns of corporation law may be 
recast as responses to the agency problem.30 For example, limited liabil-
ity: in a world of dispersed shareholders, shareholder principals are not 
able to monitor all the activities of their agent managers and therefore are 
                                                        
 29. See BERLE & MEANS, supra note 12. 
 30. As discussed below, the technical definitions of agency do not really apply to the corporate 
relationships, so all of this talk of “agency” has a rather metaphorical quality. See infra Part IV.A. 
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hesitant to enter the agency relation, i.e., to invest. Thus, in order to fos-
ter investment, the law establishes limited liability firms of various sorts, 
thereby cutting off the traditional responsibility of employers for the ac-
tions of their employees taken within the scope of employment, 
respondeat superior. 
Similarly, boards of directors, with their fiduciary duties, act on be-
half of shareholder-principals who cannot be expected to monitor the 
activities of “their” company, much less organize to take corrective ac-
tion should a problem arise. Likewise, the default rules of corporate law 
exist to protect agents who have no opportunity (or rationally do not take 
time) to negotiate the operating rules of the entity. Indeed, the mandatory 
disclosure regime that securities laws establish, with its quarterly updat-
ing and obligation to notify owners of significant events, helps share-
holder-principals keep tabs on their employee-agents. 
As a theory, modern agency law may be understood both as a re-
statement of and a marked improvement on simple “nexus-of-contracts” 
theories of the firm.31 Agency law retains the core appeal of contractual 
approaches to the corporation, namely, the emphasis on consent, and by 
extension, volunteerism and autonomy. Agency improves on nexus-of-
contracts theories, however, in at least three noteworthy respects. First, 
agency is a consensual relation but not a contract. The relation may be 
established without the knowledge, or even contrary to the intention, of 
the parties. Agency is not a legal instrument but a loose description of a 
broad set of relations that, if they are found to exist, impose legal obliga-
tions even in the absence of an actual contract. While contractual in na-
ture, agency is thus a broader and more capacious theory than contract. 
As lawyers know but economists rarely deeply understand, con-
tracting is difficult, terms are uncertain, default is common, and enforce-
ability is practically unlikely. For present purposes, a relatively small 
percentage of undertakings—and hence much less than the fabric of 
business relations—are the sort of judicially enforceable, in-fact promis-
es that lawyers call “contract.” Rephrased, the “contract” in “nexus of 
contract” is best understood as metaphor. Since agency provides a more 
capacious category than contract, it is a better term with which to think 
through and organize business relations. 
Second, the agency relationship establishes a business entity dis-
tinct from its owner or owners. Even in the minimal case, a sole proprie-
torship with employees, agency law presumes and incorporates an idea 
                                                        
 31. For the locus classicus see, Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: 
Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976). 
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of “the business” somewhat alien to bilateral conceptions of contracting. 
In agency law cases, the idea of the business arises in discussions of the 
scope of employment, and hence the liability of the principal. This min-
imal idea of the business—and some degree of an entity theory of the 
firm—matters not least because of tax law, which generally treats busi-
nesses differently from their owners. And jurisprudentially, agency law 
helps resolve issues surrounding methodological individualism. 
Third, and as noted with regard to teaching, once the idea of the 
business is established, agency law provides a theoretical narrative for 
corporate governance, including statutory corporate law and fiduciary 
duties. On this account, it is because agency relationships exist within the 
corporation that we have corporate law. Grandly, one might understand 
traditional corporate law as a highly refined form of agency law adapted 
to life within the firm. 
Taken together, agency law does a fair job of relating various con-
cepts, doctrines, and rules that comprise corporate law. For both students 
and scholars, agency law helps to define and demarcate the field. 
3. Institutional Hygiene 
Politically liberal societies presume that people are autonomous, 
capable of making choices, and that such autonomy deserves legal pro-
tection. People are also assumed to be equal to one another—status is not 
presumed to be essential. Equals should share in decision-making; thus, 
liberal societies tend to be democratic. All this is familiar and requires no 
elaboration. 
For such societies, business life is problematic, and the institutional 
life of the firm particularly so. If it has long been “self-evident” that “all 
men are created equal,”32  then why are there bosses? In firms, higher-
level workers regularly tell subordinates what to do. Those subordinates 
may choose to leave the firm, but within the context of the firm, individ-
ual choice is rare. Status matters a great deal, and hierarchies abound. 
Decisions are rarely taken on a democratic basis, and when they are, e.g., 
shareholder voting, the votes may be pro rata (based on shareholding, 
property, associated with class) rather than per capita. In short, life with-
in firms is in marked contradiction to liberal ideology. 
As noted, Coase’s Theory of the Firm arises from a version of this 
contradiction between choice and obedience. As Coase put it in an eco-
nomic idiom, Why do we observe hierarchical relations of command and 
control within firms, rather than price mechanisms, in which buyers and 
                                                        
 32. See THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776). 
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sellers may choose the price at which they interact? If people are ration-
al, and markets are efficient, then what use are corporations?33 
Agency presents a partial resolution of this conflict. Agency is 
based on consent; the agent and the principal choose to enter into the 
agency relation. In the words of the restatement, agency is a voluntary 
relation arising from the agent’s “assent,” or somewhat mysteriously, the 
agent “otherwise consents.”34 To be sure, the agent assents to act under 
the “control” of another, but the emphasis is on the voluntary nature of 
the transaction as a whole—one must volunteer to be controlled. 
Paradigmatically, the employer hires an employee. The employer is 
free to hire someone else or nobody at all. The employee is free to work 
for someone else, for herself, or not at all. Once made, such choices have 
consequences, but the fact remains that at least initial choices abound. So 
why do we observe master-servant relations in the heart of liberal mo-
dernity? The standard corporation’s answer, sounding in agency, is that 
employees assent to their status as agents of corporations. Employees 
signed employment agreements, and therefore are not slaves, wage or 
otherwise.35 
4. Political Economy 
Agency law gives us a way to explain the existence of groups, soci-
eties, and organizations. The corporation is a nexus of contracts, mostly 
establishing agency relationships. The group is thus merely a conven-
ience; the reality is the individual. Thus is the fear of the social allayed. 
Agency does this by reenacting the social contract on the corporate 
scale—it is conventional to analogize the corporate charter to a constitu-
tion. Thus, any discomfort that we feel with our culture (that any deni-
zens feel with any imaginable culture, Freud would say),36 can be met 
with the contractual narrative: this is the tour we booked. 
C. Modern Agency Law as Theory 
As discussed above, modern agency law addresses several prob-
lems for prevalent understandings of corporation law. Legal doctrine is 
used to tie together disparate parts of the basic curriculum and provides a 
professional vocabulary, thereby helping to comprise the field of corpo-
                                                        
 33. Coase, supra note 9, at 395. 
 34. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 (2006). 
 35. See Coase, supra note 9, at 404; see also KARL MARX, WAGE-LABOUR AND CAPITAL (Int’l 
Publishers 1933) (1847). 
 36. See SIGMUND FREUD, CIVILIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS (James Strachey trans., W. W. 
Norton & Co. Inc. 1961) (1929). 
1382 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 35:1369 
rate law. Agency law accounts for things that modern liberals, afraid of 
class and worried about repression, need to have explained or justified 
about how business is done. And perhaps most importantly, agency law 
begins to relate this mysterious social object, “the firm,” to the rest of 
social life. 
The mere recounting of the uses to which agency law is put sug-
gests that “theory” is far too objective and abstract a word. In various 
contexts, agency law constitutes a narrative, a myth, an ideology, a justi-
fication, what anthropologists would call an “imaginary,” and an a priori 
of certain kinds of mind confronting certain kinds of social structure. The 
corporation is thought about, explained, taught, and argued over in terms 
of agency; this says much about thought, including the not entirely ra-
tional parts of thought on which abstract theory depends. 
The priority of agency in common understandings of the corpora-
tion is philosophical or even mythological, but not chronological. Alt-
hough agency law discourse is ubiquitous, the law of business organiza-
tions, even the modern business corporation, is older than modern agency 
law, founded on consent. In short, corporation law is not historically 
based on modern agency law. Unsurprisingly then, modern agency law 
does an awkward job of articulating relationships that in fact arose else-
where, under the sway of other conceptions. Modern agency law is 
messy, hence the need for constant restatement; courts frequently get it 
“wrong,” deciding cases with language quite at odds with whichever re-
statement is current.37 
To say that agency law is mythical or ideological is not to debunk 
agency. Law needs myths, intellectual commitments, structures of justi-
fication, and the like. One might ask, however, whether our myths are 
well-told, our imaginations serviceable. Does modern agency law really 
perform as claimed? At one level, the question is juvenile. Of course 
agency law performs. As discussed above, the law articulates delegation 
more than well enough to structure the first-year course in corporations, 
gives scholars a language, and apologizes for labor relations and institu-
tions that wield great power. Those are achievements. Nor are agency 
law’s faults so great. After all, our law is not nearly so doctrinally rigor-
ous as job talks and most law review articles still presume. And surely 
the revelation of logical inconsistency or sheer silence among doctrines 
                                                        
 37. See, e.g., Lind v. Shenley Indus., Inc., 278 F.2d 79 (3d Cir. 1960) (discussing messiness of 
terminology); Menard, Inc. v. Dag-MTI, Inc., 726 N.E.2d 1206 (Ind. 2000) (finding “inherent au-
thority” after the restatement had abandoned the term); Kidd v. Thomas A. Edison Inc., 239 F. 405 
(S.D.N.Y. 1917). 
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is not shocking. So, of course agency law performs—every corporate law 
professor has seen it perform. 
Socially adequate performance, however, may not be enough. If we 
as a profession are sufficiently uncomfortable with corporation law that 
we attempt to “ground” it on some other social structure, such as agency 
law, then we might ask whether agency works to explain what we want it 
to explain. In reducing so much of corporation law to agency law, we 
must ask whether we have left out something vital. Is agency law not just 
practical, but satisfying? 
The contours of a theory bespeak specific worries. Specifically, at 
the cost of some redundancy, modern agency law addresses two deep 
concerns for a commercial society. First, what is the nature of the institu-
tions of commerce, and by extension, how should such institutions be 
regulated, what rights should they have, and so forth? What should the 
relationship between the state and the corporation be? Second, what jus-
tifies power within the corporation? In particular, what justifies the right 
of a corporation to control its employees, and conversely, imposes obli-
gations on the corporation for the often wayward acts of employees? 
As suggested above, modern agency law provides a rather servicea-
ble set of traditional liberal answers to these questions, at least superfi-
cially. From this perspective, the corporation is a business entity; busi-
ness entities are established according to the principles of agency law; 
agency law is founded on consent. Working from the bottom up, it might 
be said that the corporation is a set of consensually entered into agency 
relations. And surely individuals can contract and delegate powers; 
agents can conduct business on behalf of others; large institutions can be 
understood as chains of such delegation. And because agency relation-
ships are believed to be, at their core, consensual, the hierarchical order 
and raw power found within corporations do not offend liberal commit-
ments to individual autonomy, and we may even speak of the rights of 
such collectives against the power of the state. Modern agency theories 
of the firm thus emerge as fundamentally apologetic; such theories ap-
peal to the liberal commitments of a commercial society. 
IV. MODERN AGENCY LAW FAILS TO ESTABLISH THE FIRM 
Myths—or ideologies, if one prefers the secularization—work until 
they do not. Modern agency law explains corporation law in terms com-
fortable for political liberals (almost all law professors) only if we do not 
take modern agency law very seriously on its own terms. This Part will 
discuss how the effort to establish the firm on the bedrock of modern 
agency law falls short. First, corporate relations, which are discussed in 
terms of “agency,” do not really conform to the requirements of modern 
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agency law. Second, despite the strenuous efforts of the American Law 
Institute, agency law itself cannot really be founded on truly independent 
consent. The problems with status and hierarchy found in the corporation 
are replicated in, rather than solved by, the turn to agency law, which 
used to be discussed more candidly in terms of master and servant. So 
while modern agency law provides a handy language for articulating 
much of corporate life, agency law does not promise a more republican, 
less authoritarian, theory of the firm. The horizon is cold. 
A. Modern Agency Law Inadequately Articulates 
Corporate Relationships 
Without a principle of delegation, no large enterprises would be 
possible; owners must be able to delegate authority to run the business to 
employees. This problem of delegation and thus agency law is found in 
any business involving more than two persons—regardless of the legal 
form of the association. To recapitulate the basic course in business asso-
ciations, one might imagine a sole proprietor who hires a helper to work 
for him. The sole proprietor is the boss, that is, he expects the helper to 
work for his benefit (to help him make money) and be subject to his con-
trol. The helper agrees so to act. We have no problem recognizing a clas-
sic agency relationship here. 
Matters get slightly more complicated if a partner hires an employ-
ee to work for a partnership. The employee agrees to work for the benefit 
of the partnership, that is, the business, not the partner as an individual. 
But partners are co-owners and share rights to manage their partnerships. 
And other partners are bound by their actions. So we have little problem 
recognizing that the employee is an agent of the partnership. 
In the case of a corporation hiring an employee, however, a doctri-
nal problem arises. Consider the following: some natural person, “Fred,” 
applies to work at ABC Corp. Fred signs an employment contract and 
goes to work, subject to the control and for the benefit of ABC Corp. 
Thus, Fred is ABC’s agent, and conversely, Fred’s principal is ABC 
Corp. 
But who, in the language of the restatement, “manifest[ed] assent to 
another person (an ‘agent’) that the agent shall act on the principal’s be-
half . . . ”?38 Not ABC Corp., but Sally, the manager of the office where 
Fred sought work. Fred, however, did not agree to work for the benefit of 
Sally and subject to her personal control; Fred agreed to work for ABC 
Corp. The standard employment contract, when the employer is a corpo-
                                                        
 38. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 (2006). 
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ration, might seem to fall outside the restatement’s definition of an agen-
cy relation. 
The usual, and for most purposes completely serviceable, way to 
address this problem is to note that Sally too is an agent with the authori-
ty to hire and fire employees. Doctrinally speaking, as a manager of ABC 
Corp., Sally has actual authority to hire people like Fred. So it is Sally 
who manifests ABC’s assent to enter into an agency relationship with 
Fred. 
But how did Sally get this authority? She was hired as an employee 
of ABC Corp. Her employment contract was signed by “Lois,” another 
manager—a regress is thus established. A corporation cannot “manifest 
assent” to entry into the agency relation, thereby creating an agent, ex-
cept through another agent. But that agent needs to have been created 
too. (And behind me, said the gatekeeper, stands another gatekeeper.)39 
Thus, while it is often said that employees are agents of their employers, 
and this includes corporations, it is not immediately clear how employees 
become agents, at least if we take the restatement’s definition of agency 
seriously. Corporation law places delegation, notably hiring—the con-
struction of the business—on a foundation of agency law, but only by 
assuming agency law. 
The regress sketched here is not infinite because a corporation, 
while perhaps immortal, is not eternal. Every corporation was established 
by definite people at particular times. At the establishment of a corpora-
tion, at the first meeting, the board typically elects senior management, 
and grants management the authority to hire people. So the CEO hires 
managers, who hire underlings. Thus, the question becomes, What is the 
authority for hiring the initial CEO? 
In hiring the CEO, the board does not act as agent for the corpora-
tion in any strict sense because the corporation, as an operating entity, 
does not exist yet. Because it does not exist and has no agents, the corpo-
ration cannot manifest assent to anything. More simply put, the corpora-
tion does not exist as a contracting party until it has been formed.40 So 
insofar as agency is understood as a consensual relationship, and presum-
ing that we are comfortable with the idea that an incorporeal institution 
can consent, consent is not at issue. Instead, in establishing a new corpo-
ration, the board has statutory authority to choose management and to 
delegate much of the board’s authority to control the corporation to man-
agement. 
                                                        
 39. See FRANZ KAFKA, THE TRIAL (Alfred A. Knopf, Inc. 1984) (1925). 
 40. The nascent corporation, however, can be the object of fiduciary duties. 
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Assent is not the only reason the establishment of corporate authori-
ty cannot be derived from agency. In delegating authority to run the day-
to-day operations of the company to managers, including hiring employ-
ees, the board acts in the interest of the corporation and its shareholders. 
That is, the board is not the principal. At the same time, the board does 
not act “subject to the control” of the corporation and its shareholders. 
Just the opposite—the corporation is subject to the control of the board. 
That is, the corporation is not the principal either. Thus, we may say that 
the CEO serves the corporation, and so is in some sense an agent, but 
neither the corporation nor the board really meets the doctrinal definition 
of principal. 
The traditional theoretical proposition, of course, is that the share-
holder is the principal, and managers (and so presumably employees 
hired by managers) are agents. Again, this is a fine metaphor, but it hard-
ly stands up to pressure. Shareholders cannot be principals because they 
have no rights to control the operation of the company. Specifically, they 
do not hire and fire managers. So if the definition of agent includes a par-
ty, the principal who both benefits from and controls the relationship, 
then shareholders are not principals either. As Berle and Means pointed 
out, shareholders may be (beneficial) owners of the company, but they 
do not have rights to control. Indeed, the shareholder is in the position of 
the beneficiary of the (board’s) trust and thus is hardly a principal. 
None of these doctrinal games present difficulties for corporation 
law in practice. This is a problem only for a legal theory that claims to 
establish the institution on a foundation of modern agency law and indi-
vidual consent. In practice, the board’s authority to empower the CEO is 
unquestioned. There is a ritual for establishing a corporation; so long as 
the forms are observed and matters are handled in businesslike fashion, 
the state and others recognize the firm as a legal person with legal pow-
ers and obligations. Under ordinary circumstances, nobody questions the 
authority of the CEO to hire underlings, and underlings to hire ordinary 
employees. How else would one run a business? Such a person may even 
be informally understood as the principal in an agency relationship, but 
this is mostly imagery. 
A more rigorous theory of the firm than modern agency doctrine 
can supply would admit that the corporation’s legal personality is derived 
from state corporation law with a strong admixture of tradition that rec-
ognizes and enforces a trust-like relationship between the board, on one 
hand, and the company and its shareholders on the other. The state—
better, the social—stands at the beginning of corporate life, and, as we 
shall see, makes its interactions plausible. 
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So the founding of a corporation is conceptually awkward; begin-
nings are often awkward. Suppose that we allow the regressions dis-
cussed above to be resolved, just once and as a matter of law, by appeal-
ing to state corporate law (the social rather than the contractual). Let the 
board, by operation of state law, hire a CEO for the corporation, and 
even authorize him to hire employees. After this original lapse—we 
might say, after we have established effective corporate personality be-
cause we have authorized at least one natural person to act in the corpo-
ration’s name—can we build the rest of corporation law on a foundation 
of agency law? 
No. To see why, start with the question of whether the CEO is an 
agent as defined by the restatement. The CEO is hired to act “for the 
benefit of the corporation and its shareholders,” not for the interest of the 
board.41 But the board can fire the CEO. Thus, from the CEO’s perspec-
tive, the “agency” relationship is actually an agreement to act for the 
benefit of Y, but under the control of X. 
One may address this problem, perhaps, by saying that the proce-
durally proper action of a duly constituted board, taken in the interest of 
“the corporation and its shareholders,” is what is meant by a “corporate 
act.” So the board’s resolution hiring the CEO, if taken in good faith, is 
the action of the corporation. Thus, the CEO is really acting for the bene-
fit of Y, always absent, under the control of X, whose actions are authori-
tative because they are deemed to be the actions of Y. 
By the same token, the manager’s hiring of another manager may 
be understood as the company’s manifestation of assent to enter the 
agency relation. The manager may well retain control over the hireling, 
but the hireling is supposed to work for the benefit of the company and 
its shareholders. Again, the employee perceives himself to be working 
for the benefit of the corporation, whose assent was ostensibly manifest-
ed by X, who also derives authority from working for Y, subject to Y’s 
control. Thus, duly authorized actions of the agents of the corporation are 
deemed to be “actions of the corporation,” not just at the founding but 
also every time the board or a manager exercises power. 
Asserting that duly authorized actions of agents of the corporation 
are the actions of the corporation is problematic. As discussed above, 
agency theories of the firm understand corporation law as a response to 
agents who do not act in the best interests of the firm. The “agency prob-
lem” is at the root of boards of directors, securities laws, default provi-
sions in corporate statutes, and so forth. That is, both agency law and 
                                                        
 41. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 (2006). 
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corporation law assume that the action of agents is distinct from the ac-
tion of their principals. 
To which one might respond, it is only duly authorized actions of 
agents that are authoritative as actions of the firm. Again, this is not a 
problem in business life, but it is a huge problem for agency theories of 
the firm. Ordinarily, principals grant agents the authority to act. In the 
corporate context, however, the principal cannot act; the agent has au-
thority to act by claiming that its action is “duly authorized,” meaning 
procedurally proper and in furtherance of corporate interests. If such ac-
tion is indeed deemed “due,” then the agent’s action will be legally au-
thoritative as action of the principal, the corporation. For example, if a 
duly authorized CEO signs the papers closing a transaction, that is corpo-
rate action, the action of the principal. The CEO’s action can be under-
stood to be corporate action—the action of the principal, the corporation 
and its shareholders—only if the CEO-agent is deemed to be working in 
the way expected of a CEO, that is, if the agent meets some standards of 
behavior, usually board authorization. But as discussed above, the board 
is not the principal. More generally, agency law cannot provide the 
standards by which CEO behavior is deemed corporate action, simply 
because the principal—the corporation and its shareholders—is silent. 
Rephrased, if agency law could provide the standards for manageri-
al action, most of corporation law would disappear. Either boards and 
managers would assert that all of their actions were authorized (destroy-
ing notions like fiduciary duty), or shareholders would have to enter into 
real agency agreements, destroying centralized management. 
In sum, claims that agency law establishes some sort of bilateral, 
even personal, relationship between the individual and the corporation do 
not relieve liberal qualms about corporate hierarchy. The corporation’s 
powers, including the powers to conclude binding employment agree-
ments, dispose of the assets of shareholders, and the like, simply are not 
derived from the individual’s contractual power to form agency relation-
ships. By extension, the philosophical or psychological requirements that 
agency is supposed to address are not met by modern agency law, for the 
simple reason that modern agency law does not really explain the delega-
tions—the hierarchies—that are at the core of the business corporation. 
B. Modern Agency Law Is Not in Fact Based on Consent 
One of the most important things meant by “modern” is the norma-
tive claim that social relations are not—or at least should not be—
organized by birth. The American and French Revolutions proclaimed 
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“equality” and banned titles of nobility.42 Social relations are, in the 
modern view, to be organized by consent. In the political context, one 
speaks of a social contract and the consent of the governed. In the legal 
context, one speaks of replacing a law of persons with a law of contract. 
Less dramatically, modern agency law is modern precisely insofar as it 
seeks to substitute contract for status. 
As noted, the Third Restatement of Agency expressly defines agen-
cy in terms of consent.43 But the restatement’s effort to establish agency 
law on the basis of consent extends far beyond the basic definition. The 
American Law Institute has rewritten the very language of agency in 
terms more in keeping with a contractual age.44 The redolent “master and 
servant” of earlier restatements has been replaced by the anodyne “em-
ployer and employee”; the language of dominion has been replaced by 
the language of the employment contract. Whether this is bureaucratic 
avoidance, good manners, or mere squeamishness, the question for pre-
sent purposes is, “Can it work?” Can employment relations, and other 
business relations for which “agency” putatively provides a principled 
grammar, be reduced to contractual relations? Can agency law free itself, 
and by extension the firm, from the social? 
One might look also to the definition of apparent authority.45 When 
the [principal] manifests to a third party that [the agent] will be acting as 
agent for the principal, and the [agent] acts in a way that an agent might 
be reasonably expected to act, then the [principal] is estopped (to use the 
old language) from denying the third party’s claim that an agency rela-
tionship exists. Therefore, the [principal] is liable for the action of the 
[agent] to the third party, even when no agency relationship actually ex-
ists, which is why “principal” and “agent” have been in brackets.46 
The definition is awkward. The restatement is loath to say that 
some people simply have the status of principals, and others have the 
status of agents. From the restatement’s modern perspective, it is what 
people do that has legal consequences and, in this case, defines them as if 
they were principals or agents. As a doctrinal matter, legal status—and 
hence liability—is created by the principal’s holding out the existence of 
an agency relationship, and the agent’s fulfillment of that role, even if 
such actions do not amount to assent between the principal and agent 
                                                        
 42. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 8; THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE (U.S. 1776); 
DECLARATION OF THE RIGHTS OF MAN AND OF THE CITIZEN (FR. 1789). 
 43. See supra Part III.A. 
 44. Id. 
 45. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.02 (2006). 
 46. Once more, with letters: If A holds out to C that B will be acting as his agent, and B so acts, 
then A cannot deny liability for B’s actions. 
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themselves. Apparent authority thus has the structure of promissory es-
toppel.47 The legal function of such doctrines is to provide for liability 
even in the absence of an explicit undertaking to accept the risk of loss, 
i.e., in the absence of an actual agency agreement, or more generally, an 
actual contract. Apparent authority thus expresses society’s insistence on 
what it believes is right, not the agreement of the parties.48 
The principal’s manifestation to the third party should give rise to 
liability, even when—as is often the case—the manifestation is incorrect 
in fact. Recall, procedurally, that the third party C is trying to hold A lia-
ble for B’s actions, and that C thus alleges an agency relationship be-
tween A and B. A will often be in the position of truthfully saying some 
version of “I told you B would do something sensible, not the silly thing 
for which you are now suing me.” And A will also, often truthfully, say, 
“I didn’t tell B to do that,” that is, the “agent” was neither acting for my 
benefit nor subject to my control, and therefore was not acting as my 
agent. A then will claim that he should not be held liable for B’s actions. 
Nonetheless, the law holds A vicariously liable for B’s actions under the-
ories of apparent authority. 
The consequence of imposing liability on dominant parties for the 
actions of their subordinates is to enforce the stability of existing social 
relationships. A gentleman is entitled to rely on another gentleman’s rep-
resentation that his man (or his lawyer) will be acting on his behalf. A 
buyer is entitled to rely on a company’s representations when dealing 
with a company salesman. If the servant-employee acts beyond the scope 
of his authority, that is the master-employer’s problem, not that of the 
                                                        
 47. See the discussion of Kidd v. Thomas A. Edison, Inc., 239 F. 405 (S.D.N.Y. 1917), infra 
pp. 1393–96. 
 48. As John H. Schlegel reminds me, one might make analogous arguments about the centrality 
of social understandings, as opposed to the agreement between parties, with regard to quasi-
contractual actions. Various causes of action that came to be called “quasi-contract” were founded 
on restitution and sounded in equity. More generally, the notion that the simple bilateral contract is 
somehow obvious and foundational—the conception of “contract” presumably used in “nexus of 
contracts”—is in fact a distinctively modern conceit. 
Common law does not even begin to develop a unified law of contract until the fifteenth century, 
largely out of the action of assumpsit, which was never the sole way to get an agreement enforced. 
Nor can the process of theoretical unification be said to be complete in the twenty-first century, as 
evidenced by the need for doctrines of reliance, unjust enrichment, and the like to create obligations, 
to say nothing of various limitations on obligation, regardless of the agreement between the parties. 
All of this was clearer during the Middle Ages when there was no illusion that promises were gener-
ally enforceable. Instead, different kinds of promises, among different kinds of parties, were en-
forceable or not according to different, often formal, considerations, through different causes of 
action or other processes, enacted in different courts or other social settings. 
Surely, much that happens in today’s corporation that is labeled “contractual” is similarly depend-
ent on social understandings as on the autonomous will of the parties. The difficulty arises, however, 
when we are not so sure that our tradition is right, that our social order is legitimate. 
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innocent third party who relied not only on the master-employer’s repre-
sentation but also implicitly on the capacity of the master-employer to 
control his underlings. Tacit recognition of such hierarchical relation-
ships makes corporate manifestations credible, something to rely on 
when eating in a restaurant or boarding an airplane. Under doctrines of 
apparent authority, if principals, agents, and third parties (bosses, work-
ers, and customers) all understand and play their roles, courts will en-
force such roles by holding the boss liable for the actions of the worker. 
In light of the centrality of role, that is, social expectation, one cannot 
understand apparent authority in purely autonomous (asocial) terms. 
Agency law’s covert solicitude for the social order is undeniable in 
cases of what used to be called inherent authority and is now less trench-
antly called the liability of an undisclosed principal. The classic teaching 
case is Watteau v. Fenwick,49 as the facts perfectly illustrate the doctrines 
at issue. 
One Humble owned and operated a tavern, the Victoria Hotel.50 He 
sold the tavern to a syndicate, including Watteau, without telling any-
one.51 Humble continued to operate the tavern as an agent of the syndi-
cate, and the tavern remained licensed in Humble’s name.52 Under the 
agency agreement, Humble promised to buy supplies from the syndicate, 
including cigars and Bovril (a meat syrup).53 Fenwick was a salesman. 
He sold Bovril and other forbidden products to Humble on credit.54 On 
behalf of the tavern, Humble eventually ran up a substantial bill.55 When 
Fenwick tried to collect, Humble was unable to pay.56 Fenwick sued and 
the true ownership of the tavern, and Humble’s role as agent, emerged.57 
So the class is asked, Who pays? The salesman or the owners of the 
tavern whose business after all benefitted from selling the supplies in 
question? It seems right—and it seemed right to the court—that the own-
ers of the Victoria should pay for supplies used by the tavern.58 
The problem is doctrinal. Under what legal theory were Watteau 
and friends liable to their supplier? First, there was no contract between 
Watteau and Fenwick. Second, Humble had no actual authority to act on 
                                                        
 49. Watteau v. Fenwick, [1893] 1 Q.B. 346 (Eng.). 
 50. Id. at 346. 
 51. See id. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. 
 56. See id. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. at 348–49. 
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behalf of the owners to buy Bovril and other products from Fenwick. In 
fact, Watteau had expressly forbidden such purchases. Third, Humble did 
not have apparent authority to buy the supplies. Fenwick did not know of 
Watteau’s existence; Watteau made no “manifestation” to Fenwick that 
Humble was Watteau’s agent.59 
So the court threw up its hands and declared: 
[O]nce it is established that the defendant was the real principal, the 
ordinary doctrine as to principal and agent applies—that the princi-
pal is liable for all the acts of the agent which are within the authori-
ty usually confided to an agent of that character, notwithstanding 
limitations, as between the principal and the agent, put upon that au-
thority.60 
The court thus announces that the extent of an agent’s authority is meas-
ured by usual practice (custom, the social), not by the agreement between 
agent and principal. Buying Bovril is the sort of thing that barkeeps do. 
The owners cannot escape liability to third parties for such customary 
activity on the part of their agent, even if the third party did not do busi-
ness in reliance on his knowledge of the existence of the agency relation-
ship. 
Similarly, the court—without discussion at all—presumes that Wat-
teau is the “real principal.”61 Watteau owns the business; he is the boss. 
This is property, not contract. The court does not look to the agency 
agreement to determine the extent of Watteau’s obligations as principal. 
In fact, the court ignores the agreement altogether and simply holds Wat-
teau, as the real principal, liable for the actions of his agent.62 In short, 
consent has very little to do with Watteau’s liability for debts incurred by 
Humble. 
As already suggested, the Third Restatement of Agency attempts to 
cabin the problem of inherent authority, with its explicit reliance on cus-
tom in lieu of consent, to the somewhat unusual circumstance of a third 
party seeking damages from a hitherto undisclosed principal. In cases 
where the principal is known, some manifestation can be found, and the 
case can be decided under the rubric of apparent authority, which may be 
                                                        
 59. The court does not discuss ratification, but the restatement also includes ratification as a 
source of authority. That is, an action purportedly done as agent for another, but without actual au-
thority, subsequently may be ratified by the other (who becomes a principal). See RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF AGENCY § 4.01 (2006). At any rate, Watteau and friends do not appear to have ratified 
Humble’s purchases from Fenwick. 
 60. Watteau, 1 Q.B. at 348–49 (emphasis added). 
 61. See id. at 346. 
 62. See id. 
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thought of as a kind of estoppel, which is almost a contract. In this view, 
inherent authority is an anomaly, something of an embarrassment to the 
almost contractual doctrinal structure of agency that articulates the vast 
majority of cases. 
But inherent authority is no anomaly in the otherwise contractual 
structure of agency law. Agency’s skin may be contract, but the social, 
status, and hierarchy lie not far beneath. Consider Learned Hand’s bril-
liant opinion in Kidd v. Thomas A. Edison, Inc.63 In that case, Mary Car-
son Kidd, a noted opera singer, sued Edison on a contract for perfor-
mances.64 Edison had entered the contract as part of a plan to use Kidd’s 
performances in a marketing campaign for the recently invented phono-
graph.65 Edison’s contracts with artists like Kidd were negotiated and 
finalized by an Edison employee, Fuller.66 Maxwell, Fuller’s boss, had 
given Fuller the authority to make such deals on Edison’s behalf, but he 
had also specified a rather unusual arrangement for booking and pay-
ment.67 In actually negotiating the contract, however, Fuller had not 
made Edison’s position clear, and the engagements were negotiated on 
terms customary for booking singers.68 Kidd sued to hold Edison to the 
terms of the contract that Fuller in fact had made, and the court agreed, 
enforcing the contract.69 
Edison appealed, arguing that Fuller did not have authority to make 
that contract on Edison’s behalf.70 The question on appeal was the scope 
of Fuller’s apparent authority.71 Arguing along lines already suggested, 
Judge Learned Hand had no problem finding that Fuller had apparent 
authority.72 Edison had held Fuller out as its agent to a third party, Kidd. 
Fuller had acted like an agent. Edison was now estopped from denying 
Fuller’s authority to bind Edison. Hand explained: 
When, therefore, an agent is selected, as was Fuller, to engage sing-
ers for musical recitals, the customary implication would seem to 
have been that his authority was without limitation of the kind here 
imposed, which was unheard of in the circumstances.73 
                                                        
 63. Kidd v. Thomas A. Edison, Inc., 239 F. 405 (S.D.N.Y. 1917). 
 64. Id. at 405. 
 65. Id. 
 66. See id. at 406. 
 67. See id. 
 68. See id. at 405–06. 
 69. Id. at 405. 
 70. Thomas A. Edison, Inc. v. Kidd, 242 F. 923 (2d Cir. 1917). 
 71. Id. at 924. 
 72. Kidd, 239 F. 405 at 406–08. 
 73. Id. at 406. 
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. . . . 
Therefore it is enough for the decision to say that the customary ex-
tent of such an authority as was actually conferred comprised such a 
contract. If estoppel be, therefore, the basis of all ‘apparent authori-
ty,’ it existed here.74 
Having apparently decided the case plausibly enough, however, Hand 
dismisses his reasoning and begins a truly interesting argument (dicta or 
the real holding?) worth quoting at some length: 
Yet the argument involves a misunderstanding of the true signifi-
cance of the doctrine, both historically . . . and actually. The respon-
sibility of a master for his servant’s act is not at bottom a matter of 
consent to the express act, or of an estoppel to deny that consent, 
but it is a survival from ideas of status, and the imputed responsibil-
ity congenial to earlier times, preserved now from motives of poli-
cy. While we have substituted for the archaic status a test based up-
on consent, i.e., the general scope of the business, within that sphere 
the master is held by principles quite independent of his actual con-
sent, and indeed in the face of his own instructions. . . . It is only a 
fiction to say that the principal is estopped, when he has not com-
municated with the third person and thus misled him.75 
. . . . 
However it [the contention that vicarious liability is based on an es-
toppel of the employer] may be of contracts, all color of plausibility 
falls away in the case of torts . . . .76 
Hand thus baldly states that the liability of masters for servants is 
not really a matter of consent or even estoppel but is instead derived 
from archaic notions of status. As Hand knew, in Roman law and else-
where the head of the household is responsible for the acts of his imme-
diate family, dependents, servants, and slaves. Thus, Hand obliquely 
claimed the operation of law, in contemporary society, that included 
slavery—this from a man born a few years after the Civil War who re-
membered veteran’s tales. Hand just as surely knew that in the United 
States of 1917, the law of persons was hardly passé—racial status deter-
mined a great deal as a matter of law and women did not have the right to 
                                                        
 74. Id. at 407. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
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vote. None of this could have been very comfortable for Hand who 
thought of himself as progressive.77 
Hand’s problem, then, was to find new wine for the old bottles, new 
content for old doctrines. Edison should be liable on its contract with 
Kidd; Edison’s vicarious liability is based on Edison’s status as employ-
er, “master.” But why? It is not clear how to read Hand here. He seems to 
genuinely believe Maine’s notion of social progress—of modernity—as 
the historical shift from social relations based on status, especially birth, 
to relations based on contract, or at least acts for which the individual 
may be held responsible. But at the same time, Hand insists that the vi-
carious liability of an employer is fundamentally based on status as an 
employer. 
Hand attempts to solve this problem by arguing that the doctrine of 
apparent authority is both convenient and intrinsic to modern life. In del-
egating authority to an agent, a principal necessarily grants the agent 
some discretion. Granting the agent discretion to carry on the principal’s 
business entails vouching for the agent’s reliability to third parties. If 
principals did not vouch for the reliability of their agents, then third par-
ties would have to ask principals whether the agent was in fact author-
ized to conduct the business at hand, and the very purpose of delegation 
would be defeated.78 So within the “scope of employment,” the principal 
is liable for the actions of the agent: “Once a third person has assured 
himself widely of the character of the agent’s mandate, the very purpose 
of the relation demands the possibilities of the principal’s being bound 
through the agent’s minor deviations.” 
Note that Hand’s justification for vicarious liability for agents act-
ing with apparent authority is not based on contract but instead is derived 
from social practice. Hand assumes the social reality of corporate delega-
tion, and argues that for delegation to work and business to get done, 
principals must be responsible for their agents. This is “theory” in the 
sense of social criticism, but it carries little normative weight. Hand’s 
account does not explain why society should have large enterprises that 
rely on delegation, nor does it justify the delegation. Rephrased, for Hand 
“agency” is a structural account or description of a social practice, in 
fact, the practice of corporate life. Hand’s project is thus diametrically 
                                                        
 77. See generally GERALD GUNTHER, LEARNED HAND: THE MAN AND THE JUDGE (1994); see 
also Richard A. Posner, The Learned Hand Biography and the Question of Judicial Greatness, 104 
YALE L.J. 511, 529 (1994) (reviewing GUNTHER, supra). 
 78. See Kidd, 239 F. 405. At least sometimes, such as when closing a significant transaction, it 
can be quite difficult to ask “the corporation” whether a given action is authorized, involving resolu-
tions of the board of directors, certified copies of the minutes, secretary’s certificates, managerial 
signatures, and so forth. 
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opposed to theories of the firm based on agency. Rather than establish 
the institution of the corporation on the foundation of agency law, Hand 
assumes the existence of large firms in order to articulate a theory of vi-
carious liability under agency law. 
There is much to be said on behalf of this approach to theory, but if 
our anxiety is about firms as such—about their use of power and their 
place in society—Hand’s effort clearly does not suffice. One might say 
that the sugar economies of eighteenth-century Caribbean colonies, or 
the cotton economies of nineteenth-century American states presumed 
the existence of slave labor, and hence a law of slavery was to be ex-
pected, even if in tension with other aspects of the legal fabric. Under-
standing the logic of a social practice, and its legal consequences, does 
not necessarily justify the practice itself. 
As Hand recognizes, third parties rely on the notion that the corpo-
ration delegates to or, conversely, controls its employees. That is, third 
parties recognize hierarchical relationships, relationships of status, and 
do business accordingly. But this is to say that, despite society’s anxie-
ties about status, business requires the establishment of hierarchies, and, 
therefore, status. Thus, it is not so clear how far Hand has brought the 
argument: anxieties about (premodern) status are supposed to be relieved 
by (modern) perceptions that labor is under control, regulated by the 
profit-interest of capital? Presumably, liberals take some comfort in the 
idea that status, in the business context, is not derived from birth, at least 
not explicitly or directly. 
It is also not clear that Hand has it quite right. While his argument 
seems logically sound, the vicarious liability of principals does not seem 
in social fact to be based on the necessity of delegation or, more broadly, 
convenience—at least not always. 
Another classic teaching case, Ira S. Bushey & Sons v. United 
States,79 involved a U.S. Coast Guard ship, the Tamoroa, which was on 
blocks in a drydock in Brooklyn for repairs.80 During the repairs, the 
crew slept on the ship, but they were free to go into the city and get very 
drunk.81 Returning to the ship late one night, “in the condition for which 
seamen are famed,” a sailor named Lane opened the valves of the 
drydock.82 Water flooded into the dock; the Tamora began to list; the 
ship was evacuated; the ship fell; nobody was hurt; property damage was 
                                                        
 79. Ira S. Bushey & Sons v. United States, 398 F.2d 167 (2d Cir. 1968). 
 80. Id. at 168. 
 81. See id. 
 82. Id. 
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done.83 Ira S. Bushey & Sons successfully sued the United States for 
damages.84 
On appeal, the United States argued that Lane was not acting within 
the scope of his employment.85 The Second Restatement of Agency 
maintained that a servant’s act, in order to be considered within the scope 
of employment, had to be “actuated, at least in part, by a purpose to serve 
the master.” Judge Friendly conceded that 
[it] would be going too far to find such a purpose here; while Lane’s 
return to the Tamaroa was to serve his employer, no one has sug-
gested how he could have thought turning the wheels to be, even 
if—which is by no means clear—he was unaware of the conse-
quences.86 
In an early judicial application of modern “law and economics” 
thinking, the district court had imposed liability on the United States with 
the rationale that this was the more efficient rule and would induce the 
United States to be more careful in whom it hired.87 Judge Friendly was 
skeptical. Lane had no record of misbehavior and “the proclivity of sea-
men to find solace for solitude by copious resort to the bottle while 
ashore has been noted in opinions too numerous to warrant citation.”88 
Besides, perhaps it would be cheaper and more effective for the drydock 
owner to install locks on the valves.89 
Instead of efficiency, Friendly opined, the rule of respondeat supe-
rior is based on “a deeply rooted sentiment that a business enterprise 
cannot justly disclaim responsibility for accidents which may fairly be 
said to be characteristic of its activities.”90 So the question was whether 
Lane’s actions were, broadly speaking, “risks characteristically attendant 
upon the operation of a ship.”91 
The language of tort seems unavoidable, and Friendly confusingly 
introduces the concept of “foreseeability,” but tort—negligence—is not 
at issue.92 The Coast Guard was not negligent in hiring Lane, who had no 
record of misbehavior. At the same time, as noted, it is certainly foresee-
able that sailors will drink too much. And it is foreseeable that sailors, 
                                                        
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. at 170. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. at 170. 
 88. Id. at 172. 
 89. See id. at 170. 
 90. Id. at 171. 
 91. Id. 
 92. See id. at 171–73. 
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returning (as ordered) to a ship in drydock, may do some damage to the 
drydock. “Once all this is granted, it is immaterial that Lane’s precise 
action was not to be foreseen.”93 “The foresight that should impel the 
prudent man to take precautions [negligence] is not the same measure as 
that by which he should perceive the harm likely to flow from his long-
run activity in spite of all reasonable precautions on his own part.”94 
Foreseeability, then, comes down to what may reasonably be ex-
pected from operating an enterprise, in this case, a ship. What accords 
with common experience? At this juncture, we are back to custom and 
tradition—and Watteau v. Fenwick. Quoting Judge Andrews on judging, 
Friendly closes by saying, “‘[W]e endeavor to make a rule in each case 
that will be practical and in keeping with the general understanding of 
Mankind.’”95 By this point, it is completely unclear that contract, in the 
sense of an arrangement reached by autonomous individuals, has any-
thing much to do with an employer’s liability for the action of its agent.96 
But if agency law is not really about consent—or cannot be reduced 
to consent—then a corporation law founded on agency law cannot really 
be reduced to consent either. 
V. CONCLUSION: TOWARD WARMER HORIZONS 
The real problem with a consensual understanding of the corpora-
tion is that contract elides and obscures the social. This blindness toward 
the social character of commercial life raises two notable problems for 
political economy. First, in a world of status and rank, one might speak 
of the moral responsibility that attends privilege. In a world of contract—
contract and nothing else—duties are bargained and paid for, and the 
parties are to reduce the scope of their obligations to others at every op-
portunity, thereby increasing their profits. The consequences of such a 
worldview are increasingly familiar. So it is said that the rich in America 
are rich because they deserve to be. Good fortune, a privileged position, 
must be evidence of one’s value. This is observed most clearly in the 
now routine discussions of executive pay—that which is bargained for 
must be compensation. The responsibilities of those elected by markets 
extend to the terms of their contract; anything more is vanity. In short, 
                                                        
 93. Id. at 172. 
 94. Id. at 171. 
 95. Id. at 172 (quoting Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99, 104 (1928) (Andrews, J., 
dissenting). 
 96. See also Menard, Inc. v. Dag-MTI, Inc., 726 N.E.2d 1206 (Ind. 2000) (holding that a cor-
poration was bound by the promise of its president to sell land, despite unfulfilled requirement of 
board approval). 
2012] A Shallow Harbor and a Cold Horizon 1399 
elites in a world of pure contract do not even understand themselves as 
predatory, and business life becomes an unbridled celebration of egoism. 
This might be merely amusing except for the fact that corporate re-
sources are routinely used to entrench positions, both vis-à-vis share-
holders and society at large. 
Cardozo insisted that responsibility could not be limited to contrac-
tual duties. Specifically, fiduciary duties are “something stricter than the 
morals of the marketplace.”97 That “something stricter” is derived not 
from contract but from one’s status as a fiduciary, a person responsible 
for others. While it must be said that the restatement’s definition of 
“agency” is as “a fiduciary relationship,” the thrust of modern agency 
law is consent. This is not surprising: it is contract that moderns have 
traditionally used to bridge the gap between a commitment to equality 
and democracy, on one hand, and the reality or even necessity of hierar-
chical relations in human affairs on the other. But consent (contract), di-
vorced from tradition, does not require the responsible exercise of power 
by the elites who possess it. 
The second deep problem with the fear of the social enabled by the 
agency theory of the firm, based on consent, is if anything more unfortu-
nate: if the corporation is merely a web of contracts, then it is all too easy 
to confuse the institutions of our markets with the individuals who partic-
ipate in those markets, like the Supreme Court does in Citizens United. 
From such a stance, it is difficult to think seriously about the kinds of 
markets this society should have; political economy will continue to be 
conducted by forfeit. Modern agency law, with its squeamishness about 
status and power, obscures political thinking about the economy when it 
is most necessary. Meanwhile, real inequality in the United States grows 
by almost any measure. It is high time to admit that these are our tradi-
tions, our hierarchies, and our order. To use agency law to deny their 
existence is to obstruct serious consideration of the sorts of justice that 
may be available to us. 
From this perspective it is a fine thing that modern agency law fails 
to provide a cogent theory of the firm. As also discussed above, however, 
modern agency law, characterized by a focus on the contracting individ-
ual, and conversely, horrified by the social, should not be taken too seri-
ously.98 Agency law, as restated by the American Law Institute, is a po-
lite language, and while manners are not to be despised, by their very 
nature they do not tell the whole story. 
                                                        
 97. Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928). 
 98. See supra Part IV. 
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But what if agency law, the law through which we articulate em-
ployment and other hierarchical relationships in the real economy, were 
to be reconsidered? What if agency relations were to be discussed in 
terms of the social, that is, if status, custom, and hierarchy were 
acknowledged to matter in business relations? Would a more worldly 
understanding of agency help us to understand the firm? How might one 
begin to rethink agency, and hence the corporation, in more social terms? 
Recall that as principal the corporation is a source of authority, a 
focal point, the object of service and fiduciary duty, and a horizon for 
action, the Church incorporeal, or perhaps a telos, or in language more 
familiar to business life, a mission or purpose. While hardly the consen-
sual language of contemporary agency law, understanding a business in 
terms of its purpose is quite familiar. Indeed, from a business perspec-
tive, as opposed to a jurisprudential perspective, it is completely natural 
to understand a company in terms of what it is trying to do, or it is said, 
where the company is trying to go. Rephrased, actual firms with busi-
nesses (as opposed to “the firm” in the abstract) generally have horizons. 
Once upon a time, the company’s horizon frequently was the horizon on 
the ocean: companies were formed to go sailing to spice islands. Today, 
it is less romantically said that the corporation’s future is articulated by 
the business model, whatever the substance of that model might be. The 
empty vessel provided by corporate law, “all lawful purposes” in the lan-
guage of a charter, is filled or specified by business practice, often ex-
pressed by a mission statement and financing documents. 
Some horizon is necessary (logically entailed) in the idea of official 
action, and therefore in bureaucracy, regardless of the specific purpose or 
capital structure of the institution. One may serve a corporation’s mission 
(grandiosely: “Let’s build a smarter planet.”).99 One may serve the envi-
ronment (the EPA) or the investor (the SEC). But without an object of 
service (devotion), one’s action cannot be characterized as selfless and 
therefore cannot be “official,” defined in terms of one’s position on some 
organizational chart. One cannot have a business purpose without a busi-
ness distinct from the self. One cannot even be a good agent. 
Directors and managers owe fiduciary duties to the enterprise, 
meaning they are to avoid conflicts of interest, to put the interests of the 
enterprise above their own. Agents owe similar duties to their principals, 
the companies for which they work. Even the supposedly self-interested 
investor, the rational shareholder, must subordinate her immediate inter-
ests to a speculative vision of the future; she must postpone gratification 
                                                        
 99. IBM’s current, stunningly authoritarian, advertising campaign. 
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in the hope of living long enough to enjoy the return on her investment. 
Thus, the corporation is not ultimately about the self, as modern agency 
avers, but about risking the self in order to achieve something new and 
big, an adventure, as Cardozo has it.100 
The institution of the corporation, understood to be a bureaucratic 
entity, entails a horizon for the institution, and thereby the orientation of 
people and the formation of the sort of cohesive array of persons recog-
nizable as an institution. So horizons—collective journeys as yet un-
made—organize participation in the corporation and constitute the souls 
of the institutions that collectively form civil society, the warp of lives. 
                                                        
 100. Cardozo speaks of Meinhard and Salmon as “coadventurers.” Meinhard, 164 N.E. at 462. 
